How Much Damage Could The Fort Dix Six Have Done?

Whenever a terrorist is arrested, there is an immediate rush in the MSM and among left-wing commentators to undermine the importance of the arrest or the magnitude of the threat that was averted. For example, I remember how Abu Zubaydah was dismissed as a nobody, a minor cog whose importance to Al-Qaeda was overestimated by the Bush administration, and possibly insane to boot.* That was emphatically not the case; Zubaydah's not-especially-horrific interrogation led to the capture of KSM, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, and much of the Southeast Asian JI network.

I've seen the same attempt to dismiss the Albanian thugs who were caught planning a shooting raid on Fort Dix. Especially because these guys did a stupid thing in getting their propaganda copied at Circuit City, they're not taken seriously. Never mind that most terrorists do stupid things; one of the 1993 WTC bombers tried to get back the rental deposit on the truck he'd blown up. Sometimes we are able to exploit their weaknesses; other times we don't detect them. But it doesn't mean they're not dangerous. Likewise, the idea that these guys would have been mowed down as soon as they set foot on an Army base has gained some currency. An analysis of their plan suggests otherwise.

I've now seen most of a May 9th STRATFOR assessment of exactly what the Duka Duka Mohammed Jihad could have accomplished. They report is behind a subscription firewall, but let me quote some of it:

If the men had been able to initiate an attack on Fort Dix, the episode would have very likely ended with their deaths, but not before they were able to wreak havoc on the post.

Largely because they would have had the element of surprise, the shooters would have had a clear advantage once the attack began. Depending on their target selection inside Fort Dix, they could have created a high body count and caused significant confusion among responding forces. Once a defense was organized and mounted in earnest, the attackers would have lost any advantage and been killed.

So their plan would have probably gotten them killed, or even if they had actually gotten out quickly, run to ground by an epic manhunt. Here's more, about their target selection and the response capability:

Fort Dix serves as a mobilization point for the vast majority of Army Reserve units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The mobilization process includes training, medical, and administrative preparations and then deployment. During this process, the entire unit is together, en masse, and is deeply vulnerable to attack unless outside security is provided....[T]here is virtually no security for deploying units. ...

No MP units are stationed at Fort Dix, which means DoD and Department of the Army police—who are just as capable as MPs—provide security. Most security forces on military bases have a Special Reaction Team (SRT) on site tasked with responding to any attack or serious breach of security. Bases without SRTs typically sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a local police department for their tactical police units such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Hostage Rescue Teams (HRT) to provide assistance when needed.

However, most tactical police units take up to an hour or more to arrive and deal with a situation, which helps little when a shooter is active. Fort Dix has no resident SRT, HRT, or SWAT units. Any response would have had to come from the New Jersey State Police or local police departments.

If the six alleged conspirators had carried out their attack, they could have caused massive casualties before a response force arrived and killed them. If they planned to hit a unit that was deploying, their target would have been between one hundred and two hundred troops sitting in a gymnasium. An effective response to such an attack would take time to organize and mount, and the responding forces would have been confused, especially if the six men attacked in different locations.

...attackers have the advantage in that the only personnel armed during the normal course of their day are MP/DoD police and security guards. In facing an active shooter, military personnel are just as vulnerable as civilians, though they have training to protect themselves until the threat is neutralized.

... Responders are often unprepared (at least mentally) to deal with an attack involving multiple shooters with automatic weapons, such as the plotters arrested on 7 May were allegedly planning. Even in the realm of firepower, MPs and DoD police are not equipped to respond effectively to such an attack. MPs and DoD police rarely carry anything more substantial than a Beretta or Glock nine-millimeter handgun on regular patrols. In dealing with attackers wielding AK-47s, the police would be severely outmatched.

Thank God for John Doe at Circuit City, and for the FBI's competent and thorough investigation of these guys. It could have been another Blacksburg, times six.

*It will be interesting to see whether, under a Democratic administration, a similar level of skepticism is extended toward terror arrests.